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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (j) , this Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the February 5, 1990, order 
dismissing Muir's claims against respondents Apache and Burt. This 
Court also has jurisdiction over the appeal from the April 2f 1990, 
order dismissing Apache and the April 24, 1990, ruling denying 
relief from said order. This Court does not have jurisdiction over 
the appeal from the April 17, 1990, order dismissing Muir's claims 
against Burt, as no appeal was taken from that order. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did appellant fail to appeal from the trial court's order 
in No. 5873 dismissing defendant W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc.? 
Standard of Review: Whether a party has perfected an appeal 
is a matter of this Court's jurisdiction. Albretson v. Judd, 709 
P.2d 347, 348 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the trial court correctly»rule based on undisputed 
facts that summons did not issue within three months, as required 
by U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) (1988)? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of 
U.R.Civ.P. 4 (1988) is a question of law reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and 
Bushnell. 789 P.2d 34 37 (Utah App. 1990). 
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3. Did the trial court correctly rule that appellant's first 
action was not "timely commenced" for purposes of the "savings 
statute," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law reviewed by this Court for correctness. 
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 
34 37 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on 
merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if 
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 3 (1988). Commencement of action. 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by 
filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by the service 
of a summons. If the action is commenced by the service 
of a summons, the complaint, together with the summons 
and proof of service thereof, must be filed within ten 
days after such service and a copy of the complaint 
shall be served upon or mailed to the defendant if his 
address is known; if unknown, a copy must be deposited 
with the clerk for him, or the action thus commenced 
shall be deemed dismissed and the court shall have no 
further jurisdiction thereof; provided, however, that 
the foregoing provision shall not change the requirement 
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of § 12-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (1988). Process. 
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and 
issued by the plaintiff or his attorney. A summons 
shall be deemed to have issued when placed in the hands 
of a qualified person for the purpose of service. 
Separate summonses may be issued and served. 
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons must 
issue thereon within three months from the date of such 
filing. The summons must be served within one year 
after the filing of the complaint or the action will be 
deemed dismissed, provided that in any action brought 
against two or more defendants in which personal service 
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the 
other or others may be served or appear at any time 
before trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This is a consolidated appeal from the dismissal of two 
wrongful death actions filed by Evelyn Muir. The first action, No. 
5719, was dismissed without prejudice when the district court ruled 
on undisputed facts that summons had not issued within three months 
of the filing of the Complaint. The second action, No. 5873, was 
filed prior to the dismissal of No. 5719, and was dismissed with 
prejudice upon the district court's ruling that the first case had 
not been timely commenced within the meaning of the "savings 
statue," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. Muir appealed the dismissal of 
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No. 5719, from which both defendants cross-appealed. Muir appealed 
the second dismissal only as to defendant Apache. 
Statement of Facts 
1. This action arises out of an accident on September 5, 
1986, in which appellant's husband, Wallace A. Muir, was killed. 
2. Appellant Evelyn Muir and others filed a Complaint on 
September 1, 1988, asserting claims for Muir's wrongful death. The 
action was designated as Civil No. 5719. Rl.l. (To avoid 
confusion, the Record on Appeal for No. 5719 shall be designated as 
Rl; the Record on Appeal for No. 5873 shall be designated as R2.) 
3. Approximately one and one-half months after filing the 
complaint, appellant's original counsel handed summonses for both 
defendants to a runner, with instructions to "hold off on serving 
them" until further notice. (Jackson, p. 43. )1 Pursuant to those 
instructions, the runner kept both summonses until approximately ten 
months later, in July 1989, when appellant's successor counsel 
contacted him. The summons for W. H. Burt was forwarded to the 
Grand County Sheriff July 3, 1989, and served on July 6, 1989. 
R1.16, R1.20. 
The trial court ordered the deposition of Steven Jackson to 
be published, R1.203. The deposition was filed with the court, and 
is included in the Record on Appeal, but apparently was not 
paginated. Accordingly, reference to the deposition will be 
designated as "Jackson." 
4 
4. Respondents brought a motion to dismiss the Complaint in 
No. 5719 based upon U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) (1988), under which ff[i]f an 
action is commenced by the filing of an complaint, summons must 
issue thereon with three months from the date of such filing.11 
R1.22. In connection with the motion, respondents took the 
deposition of Steven Jackson, the only discovery undertaken by 
respondent Burt in either case. 
5. On November 27, 1989, while No. 5719 was still pending, 
Muir filed another Complaint, Civil No. 5873, asserting the same 
claims as in the other case. R2.1. 
6. On January 5, 1990, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell dismissed 
the Complaint in No. 5719 based on the fact that summons did not 
issue within the required three months. The court concluded: 
Under this state of facts, there is no doubt in the 
Court's mind that the plaintiff did fail to comply with 
the provisions of Rule 4, in that the Summons was not 
issued as it required under that Rule. The Rule 
requires that the Summons must issue within three months 
of the date of the filing of the Complaint, and states 
that a Summons shall be deemed to have been issued when 
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the 
purpose of service. The facts show that Summons was 
placed in the hands of a qualified person who was 
instructed not to serve the Summons and, therefore, it 
was not in the person's hands for the purpose of being 
served. To rule otherwise would make the provisions of 
Rule 4(b) ineffective and meaningless. 
Rl.204-05 (court's emphasis). 
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7. On February 5, 1990, respondent Apache moved the court 
for an order dismissing the second action, No. 5873. R2.35. 
Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to Apache's motion on 
February 16, 1990, R2.73, and Apache filed its reply memorandum on 
February 23, 1990. R2.80. 
8. On March 6, 1990, respondent Burt filed a separate motion 
to dismiss No. 5873 based upon the grounds that the statute of 
limitations had run on the wrongful death claims. R2.98. Muir 
filed a memorandum in opposition to Burt's motion to dismiss on 
March 16, 1990. R2.121. 
9. On March 16, 1990, the District Court issued a ruling on 
Apache's motion to dismiss. The ruling contains the following 
language: "TTIhe Motion of Apache to Dismiss the Complaint and the 
Amended Complaint as to them is hereby granted, and the attorney for 
Apache is directed to prepare a formal order in accordance with this 
opinion." (Emphasis added.) R2.132. 
10. Shortly thereafter, Apache submitted a proposed order 
dismissing plaintiff's claims against Apache. The proposed order 
did not mention Respondent Burt. Muir filed an objection to 
Apache's proposed order on March 26, 1990. R2.154. 
11. On March 22, 1990, respondent Burt submitted a reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss and a request for 
ruling, noting that the court "has already ruled in favor of co-
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defendant Apache Powder Company on the same legal grounds raised in 
this defendant's motion." R2.137. 
12. On March 26, 1990, Muir filed a notice to submit for 
decision, asking the court to rule on respondent Burt's motion to 
dismiss. R2.145. 
13. On April 2, 1990, Judge Bunnell issued a ruling over-
ruling Muir's objection to Apache's proposed order, and indicating 
that the order had been signed as submitted. R2.164. Muir 
subsequently filed a motion for relief from the April 2, 1990, 
order. R2.168. 
14. On April 12, 1990, pursuant to oral instructions from 
Judge Bunnell's clerk, counsel for respondent Burt circulated a 
proposed order dismissing Muir's claims against Burt, and on April 
17, 1990, Judge Bunnell signed Burt's order of dismissal. A copy 
of the order dismissing Burt was sent to all counsel by the district 
court. R2.175. 
15. On April 18, 1990, Apache filed a memorandum opposing 
Muir's motion for relief from the April 2, 1990, order dismissing 
plaintiff's claims against Apache. R2.178. Judge Bunnell issued 
a ruling on April 24, 1990, denying Muir's motion for relief from 
the order. R2.188. 
16. On April 27, 1990, Muir filed a notice of appeal from the 
district court "of the Order of Dismissal signed by the Honorable 
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Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, on the 2nd day of April, 1990, 
together with the Court's denial of the motion to set aside the 
order on the 24th day of April, 1990." R2.191. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Muir did not appeal from the dismissal of her claims in No. 
5873 against Burt. The notice of appeal filed by Muir states that 
her appeal is from the April 2, 1990, order dismissing respondent 
Apache and the April 24, 1990, ruling denying relief from that 
order. The notice does not include the April 17, 1990, order 
dismissing Muir's claims against Burt, and as a consequence, this 
Court has no jurisdiction over the appeal. 
If the merits of Muir's appeal are reached, the district 
court's rulings should be affirmed. The undisputed evidence 
establishes as a matter of law that summons in No. 5719 was not 
placed in the hands of a qualified process server for the purpose 
of service within the three-month period required by U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) 
(1988). Accordingly, the complaint in No. 5719 was properly "deemed 
dismissed." 
Muir's failure to comply with Rule 4 negated the effect of 
filing her original complaint. The action in No. 5719 was therefore 
not "commenced within due time" for purposes of the "savings 
statute," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. Consequently, the district 
court appropriately dismissed Muir's complaint in No. 5873, which 
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was filed more than two years after the death of Muir's husband• 
ARGUMENT 
I. MUIR FAILED TO APPEAL FROM THE ORDER 
DISMISSING W. H. BURT IN NO. 5873, AND 
THEREFORE THE ORDER IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
REVIEW. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(d) provides that a notice 
of appeal "shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, 
appealed from . . . " Muir's notice of appeal, filed on April 27, 
1990, states that Muir is appealing only the April 2, 1990, order 
of dismissal and the April 24, 1990, denial of relief from that 
order. Those orders expressly concern only respondent Apache. The 
order dismissing Burt was entered separately on April 17, 1990. As 
demonstrated by the chronology set forth in the above Statement of 
Facts, both Muir and respondent Burt treated Burt's motion to 
dismiss as distinct from respondent Apache's motion. For example, 
Muir filed a request for ruling on Burt's motion after the Court had 
ruled on Apache's motion. (Statement of Facts, Nos. 9, 12.) 
It should be noted that because the April 2, 1990, order 
dismissed only Apache, leaving Burt as a remaining defendant, it 
appears that the order was not final for purposes of appeal. The 
district court disposed of the remaining claims through its April 
17, 1990, order dismissing Burt. A notice of appeal was filed nine 
days later, but expressly stated that Muir was appealing only from 
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the April 2, 1990, order (and the April 24, 1990, ruling denying 
relief from that order). "Where several defendants are joined and 
separate judgments are entered, a notice of appeal specifically 
designating one of these cannot be interpreted to include any other 
not mentioned," Welch v. State, 390 P.2d 35, 36 (Nev. 1964); Mabrey 
v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 502 P.2d 297, 299 (N.Mex. App.)/ cert, denied, 
497 P.2d 742 (N.M. 1972). 
This Court addressed an analogous situation in Nunlev v. Stan 
Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964). In 
that case, two judgments were entered against the defendants, who 
filed a notice of appeal from the second judgment, which was 
determined to be void. It was conceded by the parties that the 
appellant could properly have appealed from the earlier judgment. 
This Court held that it could not consider the earlier judgment, 
however, as it had not been designated in the notice of appeal. 
Distinguishing another case,2 this Court wrote: 
In our opinion the Price case is not directly in point 
as in reality that case had only one judgment to appeal 
and was sufficiently designated in the appeal although 
the wrong date was inserted. In the instant case we 
have two distinct judgments. These two judgments (i.e., 
December 3, 1962, and January 2, 1963) are quite 
different . . . There would be no problem if we were 
faced only with when the judgment appealed from was 
entered as in the Price case, but here the problem is, 
which judgment is final and which is being appealed. 
Price v. Western Loan & Savings Co., 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677 
(1909) . 
As was stated in the Price case, the object of a notice 
of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal 
has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case. Respondent is entitled to know specifically which 
judgment is being appealed. The second judgment being 
different than the first and in addition void takes this 
case from the realm of a mere clerical error as was 
evidently made in the Price case. The date becomes 
material in this instance and we are not inclined to 
correct appellant's error. Although the judgments are 
essentially the same as to Stan Katz individually, in 
our opinion respondent would be prejudiced if appellant 
were allowed to appeal under the above circumstances. 
Id. at 800 (emphasis added). 
Application of the above principle is even more appropriate 
in this case, where two separate orders were entered in favor of two 
separate defendants. If a notice of appeal designating an order in 
favor of one defendant is construed to encompass a separate order 
governing a second defendant, the right of the second defendant "to 
know specifically which judgment is being appealed" will be 
impaired. 
For those reasons, respondent Burt submits that the order 
dismissing appellant's claims against it in No. 5873 is not properly 
before this Court. Even if this Court reverses the dismissal in No. 
5719, the trial court's dismissal of appellant's identical claims 
in No. 5873 will stand. The order of dismissal in No. 5719, which 
provided the basis for the trial court's ruling in No. 5873, is 
therefore moot in relation to this respondent. Accordingly, 
respondent Burt requests this Court to dismiss Muir's appeal as it 
11 
pertains to Burt. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
MUIR'S COMPLAINT IN NO. 5719 WAS DEEMED 
DISMISSED DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH 
U.R.CIV.P. 4(b). 
Standard of Review 
The district court's interpretation of Rule 4(b) is a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness by this Court. Western 
Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 37 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Discussion 
Muir filed her complaint in No. 5719 on September 1, 1988. 
A summons dated October 19, 1988, was received by the Grand County, 
Utah, Sheriff's office on July 5, 1989, and was served the next day. 
Under the version of U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) in effect in September 
1988,3 ,f[i]f an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, 
Rule 4(b) was amended effective April 1, 1990, subsequent 
to the dismissal of Muir's actions. Appellant does not argue that 
the new rule should be applied to her action, but does cite the 
"without prejudice" language in the new rule as supportive of her 
claims. Contrary to Muir's apparent belief, the result is the same 
whether the dismissal is "with prejudice" or "without prejudice." 
(See authorities discussed at pp. 19-22 of this Brief, construing 
identical federal provision.) However, to the extent that 
application of the amended rule might impair the rights of 
respondents, such application would be impermissible in any event. 
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236 (1974). 
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summons must issue thereon within three months from the date of such 
filing." A complaint for which summons does not issue within three 
months is "deemed dismissed." Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. Eldon J. 
Stubbs Construction Co., 714 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1986); Cook v. 
Starkev. 548 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Utah 1976); Dennett v. Powers, 536 
P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1975); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. 
Dietrich. 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Muir does not dispute the applicable rule of law. Instead, 
she argues that the summons in question was "issued" on October 19, 
1988. Under U.R.Civ.P. 4(a) (1988), "[a] summons shall be deemed 
to have issued when placed in the hands of a qualified person for 
the purpose of service." (Emphasis added.) It is indisputable, as 
the district court ruled, that the summons in question was not 
issued until July 1989, approximately ten months after the complaint 
was filed. The testimony of Mr. Jackson, who was employed as a 
"runner" for appellant's original attorneys, reveals that the 
summonses in question was not given to Mr. Jackson "for purposes of 
service." In fact, Mr. Jackson was instructed to hold the summonses 
and not to serve them until further notice: 
Q What did Mr. Schwartz tell you with respect to these 
summons with complaints? 
A I think he told me to hold off for a little bit. 
Q Did he give you any date or deadline as to when he wanted 
you to try to get them served? 
A No. 
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* * * 
Q Did Mr. Schwartz ever say anything to you about these 
summons with complaints after that initial time when he 
gave them to you? 
A No. 
Q So after you received them and had your conversation with 
Mr. Schwartz, you didn't talk to anyone about these 
particular summons with complaints until Mr. Copier 
called? 
A Right. 
* * * 
Q You mentioned that Mr. Schwartz told you to hold off for 
a while. 
A Yeah, that's all he told me. 
Q Was that the gist of the conversation, or was that 
exactly what he said? 
A That was what he told me. He handed it to me and said, 
"Hold off for a while." 
Q Had he done that before on occasion, attorneys had handed 
that to you and said, "Hold off for a while"? 
A He hadn't, but other attorneys have. 
Q Okay, what does that mean to you? Hold off until you get 
further word? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. And do they sometimes come back and say, "Never 
mind, we've settled the case"? 
A That's happened before, yeah. 
Q Do they sometimes come back and say, "Never mind, I'll 
get somebody else to serve it"? 
A Yeah, and then they'll give it to, I guess a process 
server. Is that what they do full time? A constable, 
I guess you'd call them. 
* * * 
THE WITNESS: He said to hold on. That usually means to hold 
onto it until I get further word. 
Q (BY MR. DRANEY) That means you're not to make any effort 
to serve it until you get further word, correct? 
A Sometimes, yes. 
Q In this case? 
A I don't know. He'd never came back and said anything. 
That was all that was said. 
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Q So you wouldn't do anything until you heard back from 
him, correct? 
A I was to hold it. 
Q Other than holding it, were you to do anything else? 
A He didn't say to do anything else. 
Q What was your understanding? You were not to do anything 
else? 
A To hold on until I got further word. 
Jackson, p. 43, lines 6-11; pp. 44-45, lines 21-4; pp. 50-51, lines 
18-13; pp. 62-63, lines 12-3; Rl. 193-94. 
That testimony was corroborated by the affidavit of William 
Schwartz, one of Muir's original attorneys. According to Mr. 
Schwartz, 
[0]n October 19, 1988, I prepared and executed summonses 
for Burt and Apache. After executing the summonses, I 
placed them in the hands of Steven F. Jackson, an 
employee of Hansen & Anderson, for the purpose of 
service of process upon Burt and Apache. At the time 
I delivered the summonses to Mr. Jackson, I told him 
that I wanted him to serve the summonses and the 
Complaint, but I asked him to hold off on service for 
a time, because our firm was withdrawing from the case 
and the plaintiffs were attempting to locate new counsel 
who might want to coordinate service. 
R1.159, para. 6. 
While Mr. Schwartz's affidavit is conveniently worded to match 
the language of U.R.Civ.P. 4(a), the affidavit reveals on its face 
that the summons was not issued until approximately July 1989, when 
the runner was requested to mail the summons to the Grand County 
Sheriff's Office. 
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The district court's conclusion is further supported by the 
fact that the summonses allegedly given to Mr. Jackson "for the 
purpose of service" were for Moab, Utah, and Huntington, New Jersey, 
locations in which Jackson had never once served a summons. 
Jackson, p. 50, lines 12-17; Rl. 174-75; Rl. 196. When contacted 
by Muir's new counsel, Mr. Jackson simply mailed the documents to 
process servers in those locations. Jackson, p. 52, lines 19-23, 
pp. 53-54, lines 18-7. 
The district court found, after reviewing the above undisputed 
facts, that summons had not been placed in the hands of a qualified 
person "for the purpose of service." Rl. 204-05. As the district 
court observed, "[t]o rule otherwise would make the provisions of 
Rule 4(b) ineffective and meaningless." Rl. 205. Muir's contention 
that the Rule contemplates handing a summons to someone "for purpose 
of service at a future date" is insupportable. Allowing an express 
instruction not to serve a summons to be considered "issuance" of 
the summons would plainly invite abuse, and would be contrary to the 
purpose of Rules 3 and 4. Muir's complaint was filed only a few 
days before the two-year wrongful death statute of limitations 
expired. The respondents remained unaware of the lawsuit for an 
additional ten months, however, due to Muir's delay in issuing the 
summons. In effect, Muir attempted to extend the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death claims to nearly three years instead 
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of two. 
It is clear from the language of Rule 4(a) (1988) that 
commencement of an action by filing a complaint is contingent upon 
timely notification to defendants. The obvious goal of Rule 4(a) 
is to ensure that plaintiffs are reasonably diligent in pursuing 
their claims against a defendant who might otherwise be unaware that 
a lawsuit had been filed. In this case, the ten-month delay was due 
solely to appellant; service was readily accomplished once the Grand 
County Sheriff's office had received the summons and Complaint. 
Muir's final argument against affirmance is an assertion that 
respondents have "appeared and litigated on the merits." (Brief of 
appellant, p. 8.) That assertion is groundless and contradicted by 
the record. "The distinction between general and special 
appearances has been abolished by the language in Rule 12(b) . . ." 
Ted R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206, 207 (Utah 
1976). Under Rule 12(b), defenses may properly be raised in the 
answer or by motion. Respondents simply moved the district court 
to dismiss Muir's complaint for failure to comply with U.R.Civ.P. 
4(b), as was done in Cook, supra, Dennett, supra, and Fibreboard, 
supra. Furthermore, contrary to appellant's misstatement, the only 
discovery of any kind undertaken by respondent Burt consisted of the 
deposition of Jackson, which was authorized by the district court 
due to the conclusory nature of Jackson's affidavit. R1.94. Burt's 
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actions in No. 5719 were thus strictly confined to the narrow issue 
of non-compliance with Rule 4. 
In light of the unambiguous language of Rules 4(a) and 4(b), 
and the undisputed testimony offered by Muir, the trial court's 
determination that Muir's complaint in No. 5719 was deemed dismissed 
should be affirmed. 
III. MUIR'S WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS WERE NOT 
COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS OF WALLACE 
MUIR'S DEATH AND THEREFORE ARE BARRED BY 
U.C.A. § 78-12-28. 
Standard of Review 
The district court's interpretation of a statute is a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness by this Court. Western 
Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 37 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Discussion 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28, claims for wrongful death 
must be brought within two years of the date upon which they accrue. 
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether appellant's claims 
arising out of Wallace Muir's death were timely filed. 
As noted previously, Muir filed her initial wrongful death 
action, No. 5719, shortly before the two-year period elapsed after 
her husband's death. A second action was filed November 27, 1989. 
The Complaint in No. 5719 was subsequently dismissed by the district 
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court for failure to comply with U.R.Civ.P. 4(b) (1988). 
Muir relies on Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (the "savings 
statute") for the argument that her claims are not barred by the 
two-year limitation for wrongful death actions. Section 78-12-40 
provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if 
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This Court has not addressed the effect on § 78-12-40 of a 
dismissal for non-compliance with U.R.Civ.P. 3 and 4 (1988). 
However, case law from other jurisdictions with similar rules 
governing commencement of actions supports the conclusion that a 
lawsuit which is timely filed under Rule 3, but which is not 
followed by timely issuance and service of process under Rule 4, has 
not been timely commenced for purposes of a savings statute such as 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed similar 
circumstances in Gleason v. McBride. 869 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
In that case, a complaint was filed against the defendants within 
the applicable statute of limitations, but the court found that the 
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plaintiffs had not complied with F.R.Civ.P. 4(j) by acting with due 
diligence in serving the complaint. The appellate court upheld the 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, stating: 
The district court also correctly held that "delay in 
service of the summons and complaint may nullify the 
effect of filing the complaint." See Application of the 
Royal Bank of Canada, 33 F.R.D. 296, 299-303 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963) (where plaintiff had not served process on 
defendant in effect, no action had been commenced and 
plaintiff could not engage in discovery procedures). 
Id. at 691. 
The court held that the delay in serving the complaint "had 
the effect of negating the fact that a complaint was ever filed" and 
the plaintiffs' action was barred, "[b]ecause in effect no complaint 
was filed within the three year statute of limitations. . . . " Id. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same 
conclusion in Geiaer v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1988), in 
which the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure 
to serve within the 120-day period prescribed by Rule 4(j). In so 
holding, the court acknowledged the preclusive effect of the 
dismissal: 
Geiger apparently filed her complaint only one day 
prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitations. Therefore, although the trial court's 
dismissal was without prejudice, the parties agree that 
Geiger's cause of action against Allen is now time-
barred. In enacting Rule 4(j), however, Congress 
recognized the possibility that a plaintiff's cause of 
action would be barred if the statute of limitations 
expired prior to the court's dismissal under Rule 4(j). 
1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 4434, 4441-42. Thus, 
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the fact that Geiger is now effectively precluded from 
bringing suit against Allen does not prevent the 
operation of Rule 4(j). 
Id, at 334 (citations omitted). 
The relevant portions of Utah and Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 3 and 4 are virtually identical. As under Utah law, 
F.R.Civ.P. 3 states that an action is commenced by filing a 
complaint. F.R.Civ.P. 4 requires service within 120 days (formerly 
with "due diligence"), whereas U.R.Civ.P. 4 (1988) required issuance 
of summons within three months and service within one year. As the 
federal courts have recognized, 
[i]t appears to be fairly well settled that Rules 3 and 
4, F.R.C.P. must be construed together, and that the 
filing of a complaint, when followed by lodging of the 
summons or writ in the Marshal's office, will toll the 
statute of limitations. (Citations omitted.) See also 
Barron and Holtzoff, Fed. Prac. & Proc. , Vol. 1, Sec. 
163, pages 277-278, wherein the authors state that the 
view adopted by the Federal Courts that the filing of 
the complaint under Rule 3 commences the action within 
the meaning of the statute of limitations, "is subject 
to the qualification that delay in three additional 
steps — issuance of summons, delivery to an officer for 
service, and service of the summons and complaint on 
defendant — may nullify the effect of filing the 
complaint." 
Hukill v. Pacific and Arctic Railway and Navigation Company, 159 
F.Supp. 571, 573-74 (D.Alaska 1958). 
The same issue was addressed in Burks v. Griffith, 100 F.R.D. 
491, (N.D.N.Y. 1984). In Burks, the plaintiffs filed their 
complaint shortly before the statute of limitations ran on their 
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claims, but failed to comply with the 120-day service provision of 
Rule 4(j). After dismissing the complaint without prejudice, the 
court noted that any attempt to file a new complaint would be barred 
by the applicable state statute of limitations. Analyzing the 
relationship between Rules 3 and 4 and statutes of limitation, the 
court wrote: 
Professor Moore recognized this problem but opined: "If 
the applicable statute of limitations is tolled by 
filing alone, timely service of process will preserve 
the action, but dismissal under Rule 4(j) will result 
in the action being time-barred if the statute has run 
after the filing of the complaint." II. J. Moore, 
supra, at 4-574. 
Id. at 493. 
State courts construing rules regarding commencement of 
actions similar to U.R.Civ.P. 3 have reached the same conclusion. 
For example, in Weisburcrh v. McClure Newspapers, Inc., 396 A.2d 1388 
(Vt. 1979), "a law suit was commenced by the plaintiff by filing a 
complaint" shortly before the expiration of the applicable statute 
of limitations. Pursuant to the Vermont version of Rule 3, the 
plaintiff was then required to serve process within 30 days, but 
failed to do so. Based on the statute of limitations, the trial 
court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Supreme Court of 
Vermont noted that "if the filing of a complaint is to be effective 
in tolling the statute of limitations as of that filing date, timely 
service under the Rules of Civil Procedure must be accomplished." 
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Id. at 1389. 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also recognized the 
fact that failure to comply with Rule 4 service requirements 
nullifies the "commencement" of an action under Rule 3. In Everhart 
v. Sowers, 306 S.E.2d 472 (N.C.App. 1983), the plaintiff initiated 
suit by filing a complaint, and a summons was issued the same day. 
However, an error was made on the face of the summons, and 
consequently the action was dismissed for lack of valid service of 
process. The Court of Appeals noted that: 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint or the issuance 
of a summons. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 3. Rule 4(a) states, 
"Upon the filing of a complaint, summons shall be issued 
forthwith, and in any event within five days." Due 
process requires that a party be properly notified of 
the proceeding against him. [Citation omitted.] In 
order for a summons to serve as proper notification, it 
must be issued and served in the manner prescribed by 
statute. . . . Where a complaint has been filed and 
proper summons does not issue within the five days 
allowed under Rule 4, the action is deemed never to have 
commenced. 
. . . Since proper summons did not issue within the five 
days allowed under the rule, the action which plaintiff 
alleges was initiated on 3 0 January 1980 is deemed never 
to have commenced. It follows, therefore, that the 
statute of limitations was never tolled with respect to 
the subject of that complaint. 
Id. at 475 (emphasis added). See also Donahue v. Dearborn. 257 A.2d 
41 (Conn.Cir. 1969) (action not properly commenced within the 
statute of limitations cannot be resurrected by "savings" statute). 
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In each of those cases, which involved rules substantially 
similar to U.R.Civ.P. 3 and 4, the courts recognized that filing a 
complaint is "commencement" of an action for purposes of a statute 
of limitation only if summons is properly issued and served in 
accordance with Rule 4. In this case, due to appellant's failure 
to issue summons timely, the wrongful death claims in Civil No. 5719 
were not "commenced within due time," and therefore Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-40 does not preserve her claims. 
That conclusion is supported by Utah law. This Court has 
consistently held that an action which fails to comply with Rule 
4(b) is "deemed dismissed." Appellant cites two Utah cases in 
support of her contention that her complaint was timely commenced. 
The first, Askwith v. Ellis, 85 Utah 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934), was 
decided prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At that time, the applicable statute contained no provision 
comparable to Rule 4 (b) and thus is of no precedential value on the 
issue.4 Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah \L988) , also does not 
As the court noted in that case, "There is no provision in 
the statute by which an action ceases to exist; by which an action 
terminates, ends, is dismissed, automatically dies, or ceases to be 
pending, because not speedily and vigorously prosecuted, or because 
no summons has been issued or served. It may well be that such a 
rule would be advisable, salutary, and just, but it is the duty of 
the Legislature and not of the courts to make such the law." Id., 
38 P.2d at 759. The adoption of Rule 4(b), providing that actions 
are "deemed dismissed" if summons is not timely issued, would seem 
to have resolved the court's concern. 
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compel a different result. The sole issue decided in Madsen was 
whether the failure to file a prior notice of claim negated the 
timely commencement of an action against a governmental entity. 
This Court held that it did not, stating: 
In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of a 
complaint or the service of a summons, not by the filing 
of a notice of claim, which is more properly classified 
as a precondition to suit than as the means of 
commencing a suit. 
Id. at 254. 
Unlike the notice provision of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
the requirements of Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure do constitute the "means of commencing a suit." The rules 
set forth the procedures by which actions may properly be commenced. 
Cf. Murdock v. Blake. 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 167 (1971) 
("Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by 
statute is deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not 
actual knowledge of the commencement of an action, which confers 
jurisdiction. . . . The proper issuance and service of summons is 
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring 
jurisdiction over the defendant . . . " ) ; Fibreboard, supra, at 1006 
("the court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the defendants" where 
summons was not issued within three months in violation of Rule 
4(b)); Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288, 290 n. 4 (Utah 1986), and 
cases cited therein. 
25 
Allowing parties simply to re-file a complaint after ignoring 
service requirements could allow plaintiffs to file a complaint but 
delay one year, five years, or ten years before issuing summons, 
relying on the knowledge that after a dismissal pursuant to Rule 
4(b), they would still have an additional year within which to file 
a new complaint. Such a result would be contrary to the goal of 
statutes of limitations to "promote justice by preventing surprise 
through revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981). 
Furthermore, a contrary interpretation would render meaningless the 
mandate of Rule 4(b) that "summons must issue within three months" 
of the filing of a Complaint. Finally, such a construction would 
conflict with the Utah legislature's express mandate that the 
savings statute yield to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
1951 Utah laws, Ch. 58, pp. 150-51 (savings statute revised, 
codified and re-enacted "insofar as the same have not been 
superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Utah . . . " ) . 
Muir's final argument is a conclusory assertion that the 
orders of dismissal violated various constitutional provisions. 
(Brief of appellant, p. 14.) However, Muir does not specify in what 
manner the dismissals were allegedly unconstitutional, and therefore 
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it is not possible to address that contention. Bare allegations of 
unconstitutionality are insufficient to overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality recognized by this Court on numerous occasions. 
See, e.g., State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987); Utah Farm 
Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Assn., 564 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1977) . 
CROSS-APPEAL 
Respondent Burt is abandoning its cross-appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, respondent Burt respectfully 
requests this Court to dismiss the appeal as it pertains to Burt, 
or, in the alternative, to affirm the rulings of the district court. 
DATED this y ^ day of December, 1990. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C 
Roger P. (jfchristensen 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant W. H. Burt 
u> 
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ADDENDUM 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS A 
RULING ON MOTION OF APACHE POWDER TO DISMISS 
THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT A 
RULING ON OBJECTION TO ORDER A 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL A 
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL A 
NOTICE OF APPEAL A 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR, 
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA 1 
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO ] 
JENKINS AND DOUGLAS BAILEY, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
W.H. BURT EXPOSIVES, INC., 
a New Mexico corporation 
and APACHE POWDER COMPANY, 
a New Jersey corporation, 
Defendants. 
i RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
i MOTION TO DISMISS 
i Civil No. 5719 
The defendants have both filed motions to dismiss 
this case contending that the'plaintiff failed to comply with 
Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, that summonses were not 
issued within three months as required by that Rule, 
The Court hereby orders that the Deposition of 
Steven F. Jackson be published and used in the disposition of 
these motions. The original Deposition has not been filed with 
the Court, and therefore the Court hereby orders that the 
original deposition be filed with the Clerk and since all three 
of counsel have referred to the Deposition and quoted from it, 
the Court will assume that those quotes are in accordance with 
the original. 
A-l 
The facts relative to the issuance of summons are 
not in dispute. The Complaint in this matter was filed on 
September 1, 1988, and on October 19, 1988, Mr. Schwartz, the 
then attorney for the plaintiff, gave Summonses to Steven F. 
Jackson, who was an employee of the firm with which Mr. Schwartz 
was associated, and that at the time the Summonses were given 
to him he was told to hold off and to not serve the Summonses 
and Complaint because the plaintiff was in the process of 
obtaining new counsel. 
In July of 1989, Mr. Copier, plaintiff's present 
counsel, contacted Mr. Jackson and told him to proceed with 
service. Mr. Jackson then sent one Summons to New Jersey for 
service and sent the other Summons to Grand County, Utah, for 
service, and the two Summonsed were served during the month of 
July, 1989. 
These undisputed facts are found within the 
Deposition of Mr. Jackson and the Affidavit of Mr. Schwartz 
that is on file with the Court. 
Under this state of facts, there is no doubt in the 
Court's mind that the plaintiff did fail to comply with the 
provisions of Rule 4, in that the Summons was not issued as is 
required under that Rule. The Rule requires that the Summons 
must issue within three months of the date of the filing of the 
Complaint, and states that a Summons shall be deemed to have 
A-2 
been issued when placed in the hands of a qualified person for 
the purpose of service. The facts show that the Summons was 
placed in the hands of a qualified person who was instructed 
not to serve the Summons and, therefore, it was not in the 
person's hands for the purpose of being served. To rule 
otherwise would make the provisions of Rule 4(b) ineffective 
and meaningless. 
THEREFORE, the Motions of the defendants are granted 
and the Court will enter an order dismissing this action for 
failure to comply with the Rules relative to service of summons. 
DATED this -> ^- day of January, 1990. 
A-3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Roger P. Christensen 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN St POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney at Law 
243 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Shawn E. Draney 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
DATED this S>^GL day of January, 1990 
/5L*.: %fi< 
Secretary 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR, 
DEANNE PFEIFFER, SANDRA 
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO 
JENKINS and DOUGLAS BAILEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
W.H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC., a 
New Mexico corporation and ] 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a ] 
New Jersey corporation, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 RULING ON MOTION OF APACHE 
1 POWDER TO DISMISS 
) THE COMPLAINT AND 
I AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 5873 
The defendant, Apache Powder, has filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint in this case, and the Amended Complaint, 
and the plaintiffs have filed an Objection to the Motion, and 
both parties have submitted their Memorandums of Legal Points 
and Authorities that the Court has considered, and the Court 
rules on the Motion as here and after stated. 
The Court will not get into the issue of the 
sufficiency of the service on Apache since this defendant 
has appeared in this case by way of a Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint and the Amended Complaint, and those Motions were 
filed on February 20, 1990. 
A-5 
In addition, the lack of proper service is not 
usually grounds for dismissal but may result in an order 
quashing the Return of Service, but nothing more. 
The facts in this case show that the Complaint was 
filed on November 27, 1989, and at that time an identical 
case was pending before this Court, Civil No, 5719; that it 
included all of the present plaintiffs except Virginia Lowe; 
and that it involved the same cause of action. 
Based upon this fact alone, this case should be 
dismissed as to all plaintiffs except Virginia Lowe. 
Procedurally you cannot maintain two actions involving the 
same parties and the same cause of action at one time. 
Civil Case No. 5719 was not dismissed until January 
5, 1990, and the plaintiffs in that case have filed a Notice 
of Appeal and the Appeal is now pending before the Appellate 
Court. 
However, the Court will further consider whether or 
not the claims of all defendants are barred by the Statute of 
Limitations as it applies to the wrongful death action even 
if the Complaint in this case were properly filed. 
There is no doubt that this cause of action for 
wrongful death is subject to a two year Statute of Limitation, 
and that the cause of action accrued in September of 1986, 
and the Complaint was filed in November of 1989. 
A-6 
It is the opinion of this Court that, for the 
purpose of interpreting Section 78-12-40, an action that is 
timely filed under Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
but which is not followed by timely issuance and service of 
process under Rule 4, is not timely commenced under that 
"savings" Statute. 
Otherwise, the whole purpose of Statutes of 
Limitation could be defeated by the mere filing of a 
Complaint with no further effort being made to bring the 
action to conclusion before the Court. 
Therefore, the Motion of Apache to Dismiss the 
Complaint and the Amended Complaint as to them is hereby 
granted, and the attorney for Apache is directed to prepare 
a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this _^ day of March, 1990. 
'; , : / 
BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge 
0016M 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing RULING ON MOTION OF APACHE POWDER TO DISMISS 
THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT by depositing the same 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney at Law 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Robert P. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys at Law 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
H. James Clegg 
Shawn E. Draney 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
DATED t h i s /w>C day of March , 1990 . 
A-8 
m o 4 mo 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS BAILEY, EVELYN MUIR, 
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA JENKINS, 
MARK MUIR, MARLO JENKINS, 
LINDA MUIR, AND VIRGINIA LOWE, 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a 
Nov/ Jersey corporation, ] 
\7. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC. ] 
a New Mexico corporation, ] 
and JOHN DOES I-X, j 
Defendants. ] 
1 RULING ON OBJECTION 
) TO ORDER 
I Civil No. 5873 
The defendant, Apache Powder Company, has submitted to 
the Court a proposed Order of Dismissal in accordance with the 
Court's prior Memorandum Decision, and the plaintiffs, Douglas 
Bailey and Evelyn Muir, have filed an Objection to the Proposed 
Order. Both parties have submitted their memorandums relative 
to the Proposed Order and the Court has considered the same. 
The Court hereby denies the objection and has on this 
date signed the Proposed Order as submitted, and finds that it 
is in accordance with the Court's prior Memorandum Decision. 
DATED this <</ -^ day of April, 1990. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing RULING ON OBJECTION TO ORDER by depositing 
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney at Law 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
H. James Clegg 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Roger P. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneyj at Law 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED this J?7L*t day of April, 1990. 
Secretary 
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Roger P. Christensen, 0648 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE 
DOUGLAS BAILEY, EVELYN MUIR, 
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA 
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO 
JENKINS, LINDA MUIR, and 
VIRGINIA LOWE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New 
Jersey corporation; W.H. EURT 
EXPLOSIVES, INC., a New Mexico 
corporation; and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
This matter became before the Court on defendant W. H. 
Burt Explosives, Inc.fs motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs and 
defendant W. H. Burt submitted memoranda and requested a ruling. 
After reviewing the parties1 memoranda, the Court grants W. H. 
Burtfs motion, for the reasons set forth in its Ruling on Motion 
of Apache Powder's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Amended 
Complaint issued on March 16, 1990. Therefore, 
SEVEN 1H,V- PIOT r^ Mf?T 
R«F0 £Kt 1 7 1990 
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 5873 
A-ll 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. All wrongful death claims raised in the Complaint and 
Amended Complaint are barred by the statute of limitations and 
are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
2. The remainder of the claims raised in the Complaint 
and Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this / / day of April, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ' ^ - - w ^ V Honorable >#byd Bunnel l 
D i s t r i c t / C o u r t rfudge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 12 day of April, 1990, 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert C. Copier 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
243 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Shawn E. Draney 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Apache Powder Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JWiOAiiijn Mijf!) 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR, ] 
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA JENKINS,; 
MARK MUIR, MARLO JENKINS, and ; 
DOUGLAS BAILEY, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, | 
a New Jersey corporation, ; 
W.H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC., ] 
a New Mexico corporation, ] 
and JOHN DOES I-X, ] 
Defendants. ; 
i RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' 
) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 5873 
The plaintiffs, Douglas Bailey and Evelyn Muir, have 
filed a motion for relief from the Order of Dismissal entered 
by the Court in this case. They have supported their Motion 
with a Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities which the 
Court has considered and read. 
The Memorandum states matters which the Court has 
already considered and presents nothing new to the Court. 
The Statute of Limitations as to plaintiff Douglas Bailey had 
run at the time of the filing of this action, and Civil Case 
No. 5719 involving the same parties and the same subject matter 
pertaining to the case of Evelyn Muir is still pending and is 
on appeal and therefore, this case could not be maintained by 
her. No case is finally disposed of until such time as the 
appeal is determined. 
A-14 
Therefore, the Court denies the Motion of these 
plaintiffs, and will not set aside the Order of Dismissals 
heretofore entered, 2£-
DATED this i^f/ day of April, 1990, 
fecfrD BUlTOEiiL, D i s t r i c t J u d g e ' 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney at Law 
243 East 400 Scutih, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Shawn E. Draney 
Attorney at Law 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Roger P. Christensen 
Attorney at Law 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
&tf/ DATED this ^J^ZA/ day of April, 1990. 
/ /Z&</IA/ U/AJL 
Secretary 
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Arh „ 
ROBERT H. COPIER - #727 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Douglas Bailey and Evelyn Muir 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0099 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS BAILEY, EVELYN MUIR 
(Appellant), DEANNA PFEIFFER, 
SANDRA JENKINS, HARK MUIR, 
MARLO JENKINS, LINDA MUIR, 
and VIRGINIA LOWE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, 
a New Jersey corporation, 
W.H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC., 
a New Mexico corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 5873 
The Plaintiff Evelyn Muir, by and through her attorney, 
Robert H. Copier, hereby gives notice of her appeal taken to 
the Utah Supreme Court from the Seventh Judicial District 
Court, for Grand County, State of Utah, of the Order of 
Dismissal signed by the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court 
Judge, on the 2nd day of April, 1990, together with the Court's 
denial of the motion to set aside the order on the 24th day of 
April, 1990. 
DATED this cx ' day of ApriLr-> 1990. 
iff/Appellant 
A-17 
CERTIFICATE QT MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was nailed, postage prepaid, 
this rv*"7 day of April, 1990, to Shawn E. Draney, attorney 
for Defendant Apache Powder Company, at 10 Exchange Place, 11th 
Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, and Karra 
j. Porter, attorney for Defendant W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., 
at 175 South West Temple, Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101. 
muirl.not 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the day of December, 1990, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
W. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC. were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert H. Copier 
Attorney for Muir 
243 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Shawn E. Draney 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Apache Powder Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger P. Christensen 
Karra J. Porter 
